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FOREWORD
In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute
held its annual Strategy Conference. The theme for this year's
conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for
the 21st Century."
New technology is one of the most compelling aspects of the
current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Technological advance has
offered advantages to one side or another at various times since the
dawn of history and the advent of armed conflict; near simultaneous
events. Because the current RMA profoundly affects the many aspects of
armed conflict, the Army must understand this revolution in all of its
parts. Just as importantly, professional soldiers must retain their
professional perspective and avoid becoming enchanted with technology.
They would do well to remember that while technologically sophisticated
weapons can help secure victory, technology in and of itself cannot win
wars. Ultimately, wars are won or lost in the minds of soldiers and
their leaders.
Soldiers can learn about warfare from either personal experience
or from studying history. Clearly, actual combat provides very obvious
lessons, but the curriculum can be painful. Failure and death are often
synonymous. The study of the history of warfare provides the student
with an opportunity to examine critical aspects of warmaking without the
same risk. Fortunately for those who study the reasons for, and results
of, conflict, this year's Strategy Conference began with a keynote
address by one of the world's foremost military historians, Sir Michael
Howard. His address was followed, in the first formal session, by a
paper presented by Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr.
Sir Michael and Professor Guilmartin are historians who have
experienced warfare; indeed, have distinguished themselves in combat.
Sir Michael Howard served in the Coldstream Guards in Italy in the
Second World War. Dr. Guilmartin served two tours as a U.S. Air Force
rescue helicopter pilot in Vietnam. Their personal experience with
warfare is expressed eloquently in the following pages as they make the
point that war is, as Carl von Clausewitz defined it nearly 200 years
ago, a distinctly human endeavor.
Clausewitz wrote, "the nature of war is complex and changeable."
Because the Revolution in Military Affairs makes warfare all the more
complex and changeable, one would be well advised to heed another of
Clausewitz's admonitions, "The use of force is in no way incompatible
with the simultaneous use of the intellect." We have elected to present
the thoughts of these two warrior scholars in one volume so as to
provide the reader with something of the synergy they developed in their
presentations during the Strategy Conference.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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HOW MUCH CAN TECHNOLOGY CHANGE WARFARE?
Sir Michael Howard
There is a tendency among military professionals, particularly in
the United States, to look to history for "lessons." This is not wise.
It has been well said the words, "All History Teaches..." are usually
followed by bad history and worse logic. History is simply what
historians write, and what they write is often determined by their
prejudices. The best that even the best historians can do, on the basis
of their knowledge about the past, is to pose questions and issue
warnings about the future.
The answer to the question posed by the title of this essay is
obviously, "Quite a lot." The essence of war, however, remains the same
no matter how one defines that essence. Carl von Clausewitz's definition
of war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" is as
valid today as it was two hundred years ago.1 Violence is what turns a
conflict into a war. Trade wars and tariff wars may involve conflicting
interests, but unless there is an element of organized, sanctioned and
purposeful violence, these are not war. I shall therefore work
pragmatically on the assumption that, whatever changes brought about by
social and technological transformation, the essence of "war" remains.
Clausewitz likened it to a chameleon that takes the color of its
surroundings. While warfare may seem to change, it remains as Clausewitz
defined it, just as the chameleon, whatever color it adopts, remains the
same animal still.2
All historians do agree, however, that a systemic change in the
conduct, if not in the nature, of war was brought about during the 19th
century by the technical transformations of the industrial age. So long
as society depended upon manpower, waterpower, windpower, and animal
power for its energy sources, warfare had consisted basically of battles
or sieges conducted by armies whose size was narrowly constricted by
logistical limitations. In consequence, there was little systemic
difference between the campaigns of Julius Caesar and Scipio Africanus
on the one hand, and those of Marlborough or Frederick the Great on the
other. The study of the "Great Captains" of antiquity was, with good
reason, regarded as being still the best preparation for the conduct of
war in 18th century Europe. Technical innovations had indeed made
incremental changes. The stirrup made cavalry a controllable instrument
for organized battles as well as for sporadic raiding. Mobile heavy
artillery transformed siege warfare as it had been conducted from
antiquity until the end of the Middle Ages. The combination of the ring
bayonet with the flintlock provided a force-multiplier for infantry,
making every soldier his own musketeer as well as pikeman. The same kind
of force-multiplying effect was gained when Jean Baptiste de
Gribeauval's French army reforms resulted in a new generation of more
mobile and accurate field guns in the mid-18th century.
Clausewitz held that battle is as essential to warfare as cash
transaction is to business. Throughout the agrarian age war consisted,
if not of battle, then of the search for battle. And battle consisted,
or was seen to consist, in corps-a-corps fighting with "cold steel"--the
arme blanche. All developments in fire power were perceived as ancillary
to this. Artillery was developed to make it possible for infantry to
close with the enemy, not to make it unnecessary. Infantry volley-fire

was always preliminary to a charge.
Around this perceived necessity for the decisivecorps-a-corps
encounter, a whole military culture developed. In this social hierarchy
those who delivered the "shock" in battle, the cavalry and elite
infantry, were at the top. All ancillaries, including artillery, took
their places lower down the pecking order. Napoleon Bonaparte became an
artillery officer because he did not have the social standing to get
into the infantry or cavalry. It is interesting to speculate whether he
would have been quite so innovative in the conduct of war if his
pedigree had been good enough for the cavalry.
During the agrarian age, the only fundamental changes that
occurred in the conduct of war were the results of social and political
factors rather than technological innovation. For instance, the chivalry
of Western Europe, which had monopolized the conduct of war for half a
millennium, was destroyed on the battlefields of France and Burgundy in
the 14th and 15th century by soldiers wielding pikes and bows, weapons
that had been around for quite a long time. It was not the advent of
those weapons that eclipsed mounted, chivalrous warfare; rather it was a
fundamental change in social attitudes that allowed peasant bowmen and
pikemen to be promoted to the core of the English and the Swiss orders
of battle. Further, it was only the development of the bureaucratic
state in early modern Europe that made possible the development of
professional, disciplined, long-serving armed forces, especially navies.
(Part of their professionalism, incidently, consisted in the study and
mastery of weapon technology.) And it was the French Revolution, not
any technological breakthrough, that made possible the Napoleonic
campaigns, which not only introduced a new operational concept into
warfare but overthrew an entire political order in Europe and prompted
Clausewitz to foresee a new era of "absolute" war.
Clausewitz prophesied better than he knew. The industrial age
which was just dawning in his lifetime, and of which he was totally
unaware, did indeed transform warfare. It did so by increasing the
range, accuracy, and lethality of weapons, while
logistical
developments, in particular the railroad and the telegraph, made
possible total war on a scale such as even Clausewitz had never
conceived. Between them, these two developments produced the destructive
deadlock of the First World War. The development of firearms,
magazine-fed repeating rifles for the infantry and breech-loaded guns
for the artillery made it impossible for armies to come to sufficiently
close quarters to obtain the kind of decision that battles had always
been fought to achieve. The development of railroads, telegraphs, and
supply systems meant that the size of armies was such that their
limitations were determined only by the size of the population and the
economic capacity of the state to train and sustain them. The result was
what might be called Total War Mk. I, on the assumption that Napoleonic
warfare had been no more than an overture setting out the principal
themes. In Total War Mk. I, the entire resources of the state were
mobilized to sustain armies in the field whose only formula for victory
was attrition and whose commanders were military managers like Ulysses
S. Grant and Douglas Haig rather than the "Great Captains" of military
legend. The object of operations became, not the destruction of the
enemy army on the battlefield, but, by engaging that army in prolonged
and inescapable battles of attrition, to bleed the opposing society to
death. The first example was Grant's campaigns of 1864-65; the most
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notorious, the Western Front in World War I in 1916 and 1917.

Total War Mk. I was to be rendered partly obsolete by further
technological innovations. Mechanization, the development and
application of the internal-combustion engine, and radio communications
restored mobility and decisiveness to the battlefield. Air power not
only extended the battlefield itself, but made it possible to attack the
social structure and the economic resources that maintained the armed
forces in the field, and to do so more directly and, in many cases, more
completely than naval blockade ever had.
In Europe, these developments of the later industrial age led to
Total War Mk. II. In this phase of warfare civilians became involved,
not just as part of the mechanism supporting the armed forces, but as
targets almost more significant than the armed forces themselves; not
only because of their role in producing the resources that made military
operations possible, but because their morale was seen as a principal
element making it possible to conduct war. The "ideal model" ofTotal
War Mk. II was that of the air power enthusiasts who believed that it
might be possible to decide a war without surface forces engaging at
all, but this was never achieved in World War II. That conflict was also
to be decided by attrition, victory going to the strongest industrial
powers. Air power provided only an important additional dimension.
Commanding generals such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery, Georgi K. Zhukov, and Gerd von Rundstedt were, essentially,
military managers. "Great Captains," such as Erwin Rommel, George S.
Patton, and the British commander in Burma, General William Slim, who
carried on the heroic image of the agrarian age, were effective only
under exceptional circumstances and then usually at the margins.
The atomic bomb seemed to epitomize the era ofTotal War Mk. II.
After the Korean War, the battlefield itself was held in many quarters
to be an anachronism; certainly in any conflict between nuclear-armed
powers. Some laymen maintained that nuclear weapons would make war
itself impossible. Even professionals had to accept that the conduct of
war in any traditional sense would be possible only when political
circumstances set strict limits to the likelihood of its escalation.
Under those conditions, it seemed possible that traditional battlefield
skills might again come into their own. Three Arab-Israeli wars pointed
in that direction, even if the conflict in Vietnam did not. Whether the
technology of the post- industrial age will renew the need for
battlefield skills, or transform war in totally new directions, is a
subject that is being discussed at war colleges throughout the world.
*******
Since Operation DESERT STORM, there has been a focus on the
technological dimension of warfare. The social dimension however, is no
less important--possibly even more. In fact, the two cannot be
separated. Social structures and social needs produce technological
innovation, while that innovation in turn affects, and sometimes
transforms, the social system out of which it has developed.
In the agrarian age, as previously stated, the conduct of war was
based on the concept of the decisive battle, and the conduct of battle
on that of the decisive shock. This concept determined not only the
structure of the military hierarchy, but that of an entire social and
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political order. Society was governed by a warrior caste whose primary
function was leadership in battle. This remained the case in Europe
through the 19th century and even into the 20th. The Emperors of France
and Austria and the King of Prussia were present on the battlefields in
1859 and 1866. Napoleon III surrendered himself and his army to the King
of Prussia to avoid further carnage at the Battle of Sedan in 1870.
Kaiser Wilhelm II remained titular commander of the German armies
throughout the First World War, while Czar Nicholas II, with General
Mikhail Alekseyev as his chief of staff, assumed personal command of the
Russian Army on the Eastern Front.
Agrarian societies were thus based on a military hierarchy, and
the classes that did not conduct war, the merchants and peasants, were
socially subordinate to those that did. War was an acceptable, indeed a
dominant and often a continuous activity. Further, horrible though war
might be, peace was not much better. Disease, pain, suffering, and
grinding hardship was the fate of all but a minute minority of the human
race. Death came in violent and terrible ways to many who never
experienced battle. Death in battle, at least, was accompanied by
prestige and panache, while for those who survived, participation in a
successful campaign held out hope of social and financial advancement.
With the dawn of the industrial age all this began to change.
Increased life expectancy was accompanied by increased comfort
expectancy. Violent and agonizing death became exceptional. The more
societies "advanced," the more they considered war to be barbarous
rather than heroic. This, paradoxically, was happening at a time when
the conduct of war was becoming dependent on conscript armies. One of
the great anxieties of European governments at the beginning of this
century, indeed, was whether these conscript armies would actually
fight, and how their populations, drawn from an increasingly urban
environment, would endure the necessary hardships of war.
In fact in World War I, the populations endured astonishingly
well. This was partly because of the social solidarity produced by
national sentiment; partly because for many European armies, especially
for those in Eastern Europe, the standard of living in the armed forces
was rather higher than what they were used to at home. But mainly they
endured because there remained, even in societies as industrialized as
Britain and Germany, a considerable residue of the standards and values
of the agrarian age. These values included a respect for authority,
deference to the monarchy and aristocracy, and a surviving tradition
among the ruling classes of heroic leadership. But national sentiment
and disciplined obedience had its limits, and during that war, almost
imperceptibly, a major transformation occurred in the conduct of battle.
At the outset in 1914, artillery fire was still being used to make
possible the decisive assault a la baionnette. But by the end of the
war, the function of fire power was to make that assault unnecessary. In
the words of the French, who took the lead in this development, "It is
fire that conquers ground; infantry occupies it." Conscript armies
showed themselves increasingly unwilling to die gloriously on the
battlefield. If they did not actually mutiny, as did the Italians and
the French, they showed other ways of making that unwillingness felt. At
home, the civil populations increasingly did the same. By the end of
that war, the concern among political, and to a lesser extent among
military, elites throughout the Western democracies was how to use
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technology in future wars to prevent the troops from being killed.
This reaction did not affect the Germans to the same extent.
Partly because their highly professional armed forces were limited in
size by the Versailles Treaty until Adolf Hitler denounced its
disarmament clauses and Germany began rearming in 1935, the Germans
turned to the innovative use of technology to enhance the effectiveness
of their smaller army through the use of Blitzkrieg tactics. Perhaps
more important, the Nazi revolution did its best to indoctrinate the
German people, especially the young German people, with all the warrior
values of the agrarian age that the "decadent" West seemed to be losing.
This they did exceptionally well, as indeed did the Japanese. Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan proved themselves such formidable adversaries
because they combined the techniques of industrial societies with the
values and skills of the agrarian age bolstered, respectively, by
elements of Norse mythology and Bushido traditions.
Eventually the Allies wore down the Germans and the Japanese
under conditions very comparable to those under which the industrialized
Union wore down the armies of the agrarian Confederacy during the
American Civil War. But it has to be admitted that, with all their
technological advantages, the conscript armies of the Western
democracies in World War II did lack battlefield skills. They did not
excel at close-quarters fighting. For the most part they were very
reluctant to run risks, and most of their generals were reluctant to
make them do so. They committed their forces to action only if they
could support them with massive fire-power and by air power.
Furthermore, these forces were provided with supplies, and medical and
recreational facilities that replicated, as far as possible, the
standard of living they enjoyed at home. It proved a slow and expensive
way of making war, but given the standards and expectations of late
industrial societies, there really was no other way in which it could be
done.3
All this tended to bear out the apprehensions of the 19th-century
military analysts. Industrial societies no longer nourished the skills
and virtues that had been needed in agrarian-age war. The expectation
was that military technology would make the skills and virtues of the
warrior unnecessary. The enemy, his military forces as well as the
supporting society, could be destroyed at long distances from positions
of comparative safety. Whether in the air or on the ground, increasingly
it was felt that, insofar as close-quarter fighting was necessary, it
should be left to small teams of specialists; commandos, paras, Special
4
Forces, Special Operations aircraft, and the Special Air Service.
This kind of war at long range seems very sensible and civilized,
but a troubling question remains. In spite of all the technology of the
industrial and post-industrial age, does there not still lie at the core
of all warfare a need to engage in the basic, primitive encounters of
the agrarian age? And was not the lesson of Vietnam that, if the
capacity to do so disappears, no amount of technology is going to help?
To put it in brutal terms, soldiers must not only know how to kill, but
must also be prepared if necessary to die. More important, the societies
that commit them to action must be prepared to see them die; and in
these days of CNN quite literally so. Western societies have learned how
to kill on an enormous scale, but they may still fight at a disadvantage
against agrarian age armies who have not forgotten how to die and know
5

well-enough how to kill. The Vietnam War and the recent experience in
Somalia indicate that if those agrarian age armies are well-led, and if
their leaders develop superior strategies, they can still prevail. A
readiness to engage in close combat in which there is a very high risk
of mortality remains the basic requirement, not only of the specialists
in violence, but of every man and woman in uniform. When they put on
that uniform, they are accepting that risk.
So long as, in the words of Hilaire Belloc,
We have got
The Maxim gun,
and they have not
the skills and virtues of the agrarian age may no longer be so essential
as they were in the past. But even today our forces have to engage in
combat against highly-motivated peoples whose primary concern is to kill
them; and are willing to risk their own lives to do so. Furthermore,
they may have the equivalent of the Maxim gun as well. Future conflicts
will not be so conveniently one-sided as was the Gulf War. Will future
technology be able entirely to eliminate the need for the armed forces
of Western societies to be placed in situations where they are required
not only to kill, but accept the risk of being killed, perhaps in large
numbers; and will our post-industrial societies find that acceptable? In
short, can technology change what has until now been the essence of
warfare?
Notes:
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Parets,
eds., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989 ed., p. 75.
2. Ibid.
3. The United States, at least, perhaps because the final victory
in World War II was so complete, did not seem to learn from the
experience. The swimming pools, officer clubs, indoor and outdoor movie
theaters, tennis courts, gymnasiums, even miniature golf courses,
bowling alleys, and archery ranges built into the more lush American
bases throughout Vietnam and Thailand a quarter century later, are
testimony to that fact. Ed.
4. A technological case in point is the U.S. Air Force
McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber. It was conceived in the
early 1950s for the U.S. Navy as an air-to-air missile launching
platform to be used for fleet defense. During the Vietnam War, the Air
Force and the Navy used it to perform attack missions. Only in its very
last production models (the F-4Es built in the late 1960s and early
1970s) was an internal gun included so that it could perform the
"warrior-like" mission of aerial combat (called "dogfighting") more
effectively. During the 1960s, despite evidence to the contrary
resulting from aerial engagements in the skies over North Vietnam,
training in air-to-air combat maneuvering and gunnery was practically
nonexistent in the U.S. Air Force based on the assumption that advances
in air-to-air missile technology would make old fashioned dogfighting
unnecessary. Ed.
6

TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY:

WHAT ARE THE LIMITS?

John F. Guilmartin, Jr.
technology, n., (1): the application of knowledge to achieve
a physical effect by means of an artifact, object or thing
(distinct from art, which involves the application of
knowledge to achieve aesthetic effect). (2): the artifact
itself; the class of artifacts to which it belongs. (3): the
knowledge needed to design, manufacture, operate, sustain and
logistically support the artifact or thing and its user(s).
Author's working definition
Sometime around the beginning of the fourth millennium BC an
anonymous metalworker in the Fertile Crescent, no doubt after
consultation with his village hero, the defender of fields and
agricultural surplus, smelted a quantity of imported ore and cast a
small sphere of copper pierced with a hole tapered to accept a haft.
Breaking the object from its mold, he dressed and polished it and
inserted the haft, fashioned from wood carefully chosen for strength,
resilience, and perhaps magical properties. He then fixed the sphere
securely in place with wedges, thongs or perhaps glue, a chore of vital
importance, for the bond between haft and sphere would have to reliably
resist unprecedented accelerational and vibrational forces in the harsh
arena of combat, and structural failure would expose the user to lethal
risk. Invoking the blessings of the deities who presided over the
smelting and hafting processes and had permitted him to penetrate their
mysteries, he presented the finished object to the hero. In so doing, he
completed the research and development (R&D) cycle of the acquisition
program of the first weapons system--or for that matter any system--to
use metal for other than ceremonial or ornamental purposes: the
copper-headed mace.1
To this point, the production of food, clothing and shelter had
been the leading edge of technology. The development by selective
breeding in late Paleolithic and Neolithic times of plant and animal
sources of food and fiber was perhaps the most impressive achievement,
though the development of seafaring, fired pottery and polished stone
2
implements for cutting and grinding was not far behind.
The earlier
development of the bow, no doubt for hunting though arrows could kill
humans as well as game, was a major benchmark as well. Whether the
application of animal traction to agriculture came before or after the
development of the stone-headed mace is not known. What is clear is that
the appearance of sedentary agriculture and storable food surpluses made
3
the specialist combatant both possible and necessary.
We know little
about the first military specialists, but it is clear that their ideas
about weaponry, its production and uses, diverged sharply from those of
hunter-gatherers who might supplement their larder by raiding
neighboring tribes. From that change in attitudes emerged the
specialized technology of war, and with the appearance of the
copper-headed mace military applications assumed a leading role in the
development of technology which they have rarely relinquished since.
We can surmise the rest of the story from the archaeological and
historical record. The hero, skilled in the use of the stone-headed
mace, adjusted his swing and footwork to the new and more powerful
7

weapon, no doubt with the aid of a sparring partner. The results were
sufficiently encouraging to prompt adoption of the new weapon.
Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) was a smashing success, both
figuratively and literally. Invoking the protection of the gods of the
village and battle, the hero demonstrated the effectiveness of the new
weapon, laying out for divine and human inspection in Chalcolithic body
count the barbarian warriors whose crushed skulls were proof of its
power--and of that of the gods which sponsored its development. As
fabricator and wielder hoped, the bold use of a new technology had
yielded important advantages in combat. But copper was scarce and smiths
able to work it scarcer still. Copper-headed maces were wielded only by
the select of the gods and the possession and use of such weapons became
closely associated with divine approbation and earthly power.
Significantly, the earliest known inscription in which an individual
human being is identified by name, the Palate of King Narmer dating from
around 3,100 BC, depicts the first Pharaoh of Upper and Lower Egypt
4
ceremonially smashing the forehead of a prostrate enemy with a mace.
The copper-headed mace in the hands of a powerful champion
remained the world's premier weapons system for a very long time, but
then as now both technology and the political ends to which it was
applied were subject to change. In Egypt and regions of the Fertile
Crescent blessed with broad river valleys and fertile soil, villages
gave way to cities. Competition for resources and favor in the sight of
the gods increased and the defenders of cities fought one another as
well as barbarians. The barbarians responded to increasing prosperity
among the civilized polities with increased aggression and to advances
in civilized weaponry by augmenting the power of their traditional
weapons, notably the bow. Proliferation became a reality as barbarians
adopted metal points for their spears and arrows. The smith provided the
hero with protective armor of leather-backed Electrum to shield his body
from stones and arrows and to protect his head from the crushing blow of
a mace. Early in the third millennium, Sumerian smiths responded to the
appearance of effective head protection by developing a whole new
technology, first manifested in the piercing axe of arsenic bronze. The
appearance of the piercing axe accelerated the race between offensive
and defensive weaponry which continues to this day and ushered in a
whole new age, the Bronze Age.
The above summary, of course, is simplified. Examined in detail,
the interplay in late prehistoric and early historic times among
developments in the design and production of weapons systems; changes in
the way in which they were viewed and used; evolution of the social,
ideological and economic systems they served; and--the crux of the
matter--changes in the ways in which weapons systems served political
ends, both in perception and reality; were far more complex. Regions
slipped into and out of the Bronze Age as reserves of easily-worked ores
were depleted and better smelting technologies were developed. Long
5
distance trade in strategic materials became increasingly important.
“Barbarians" engaged by hydraulic civilizations as mercenary warriors
overthrew their employers and established their own dynasties, merging
languages and cultures.
From the military and technological perspective, the lessons are
clear. Advances in technology have yielded important military advantages
from the earliest times. More often than not the demands of war press
technological change first and farthest. The technology of war is
8

developed and applied within a cultural and social context of which
supra-rational beliefs are an important part. Evaluation criteria
revolving around tactical success are an integral part of the process of
selection or rejection. Finally, the production of high technology
weaponry may well depend on imported materials.
Finally, this example from remote antiquity makes a two-fold
point: first, that the decision-making matrix within which the
technology of war is developed, tested, adopted or rejected, and applied
in combat is at bottom culturally-derived; and, second, that the
essential categories in that matrix have seen remarkably little change
over the ages. In short, history is relevant.
After briefly describing the establishment of the geo-political,
technological and cultural context within which our military
institutions presently operate, this monograph will then trace the
technological developments which formed the backdrop for the supposed
military technological revolution of the recent past. For a number of
reasons, the story begins in 1914. First, by then the national
boundaries and perceived national interests of the major economic and
military players in today's international arena were in place. Second,
the basic notions of national interests, national policy objectives and
the appropriate national and military strategies for pursuing them were
also in place or emerged shortly thereafter. On a technical military
level, the continuing influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan's Theory of Sea
Power, promulgated in the late 1890s, substantiates this point. Finally,
one can argue that our basic notions of military strategy and tactics at
the national level, and professional military officers' ideas of how to
go about implementing them, are firmly rooted in the experience of World
War II and largely derived from World War I. The fact that the United
States participated in both wars served to reinforce their lessons. Much
of our technical military vocabulary comes to us directly from the two
world wars: front lines, frontal system (as in weather forecasting),
barrage, strafe, flak, spotting artillery and calling out bandits by
clock position; so do our approaches to recruiting, training, weapons
system procurement and organization of the national industrial and
scientific base for war. Having briefly delineated this baseline,
offered as a war paradigm, this monograph will then examine recent
changes in the technology of war and address the proposition that they
are of sufficient magnitude to require a paradigm shift.
When Gabrilo Princip shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in
Sarajevo to start the First World War, the essential elements of our war
paradigm, though not their interpretation, were in place. Industry, and
through industry science, had been firmly and more or less formally
harnessed to war, though navies were more clearly aware of the link than
6
armies and more skilled at exploiting it.
Air forces existed in nascent
form. Artillery technology on land and at sea had been brought to a
level which differs from today's only in degree by the universal
adoption of nitrocellulose-based propellants; high explosive shells with
time delay fuses; hydro-pneumatic recoil systems; and breech loading,
quick fire mechanisms. Armies throughout the world had standardized on
small arms using ammunition which differs in no essential way from the
predominant form in use today: a fixed round consisting of brass case,
nitrocellulose propellant, impact primer and jacketed lead bullet.
The determinant of strategic capability subject to the greatest
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change over the next three quarters of a century lay not in weaponry,
but in the industrial base. In 1914, industrialized nations with
adequate reserves of coal and iron ore were essentially militarily
self-sufficient, dependence on natural nitrates for high explosives
production having been eliminated as a strategic consideration by the
recent German discovery of atmospheric nitrogen fixation. Transportation
and steel production were the critical determinants of military
strategic power, manifested in weapon and munitions production, capital
ships and railroad mobilization. All were fueled by coal. Indeed,
industrial capacity, and hence military capacity, was almost congruent
with coal and iron ore reserves, Japan being the only exception though,
for the moment, a minor one. To be sure, the successful adaptation of
the internal combustion engine to military applications was a harbinger
of things to come. During the Great War, gasoline-fueled aero engines
would absorb only a tiny proportion of fuel energy expended, but
aircraft would exercise a disproportionate influence on land operations
by its end. The same point applies to the strategic impact of
diesel-powered submarines at sea. In the run-up to war, Britain had
begun construction of a new class of capital ships powered by oil-fueled
steam turbines, the Queen Elizabeth class battleships, to exploit of the
substantial advantages of oil over coal in thermal and volumetric
efficiency, consciously accepting the strategic vulnerability implicit
in dependence on imported oil--and hedging its bets by seizing the
recently-discovered Iranian oil fields.7
Imports in certain specialized niches were important to the
conduct and outcome of the First World War; significantly, these took
effect at the high end of the technology spectrum: American spruce was
important to French and British aircraft production. Petroleum was
sufficiently important strategically--most critically for aviation
gasoline though gasoline-powered trucks and tractors performed certain
essential tasks beyond the capacity of horses--and the Central Powers'
reserves sufficiently small that only Romania's obliging declaration for
the Allies in 1916 saved Germany and Austria-Hungary significant
embarrassment by placing the Ploesti oil fields in their hands. The
petroleum-based lubricants of the day broke down under the temperatures
produced by high performance rotary radial aero engines and the British
blockade denied Germany supplies of the castor oil they required,
effectively grounding some of Germany's best fighters of 1918. On the
whole, however, the war economies of the powers whose military forces
dominated the conflict were self-sufficient and coal powered.
By the eve of the Second World War, oil had supplanted coal and
iron as the critical determinant of military power. Coal and iron ore
retained their importance to war production, to be sure; steel was vital
to weapons manufacture and coking coal was needed to smelt steel.
Moreover, while bunker oil had largely replaced steam coal as the fuel
of navies and merchant marines, coal-fueled steam locomotives and
electric power plants played a vital role in the war economies of the
contending powers. Indeed, the sophistication with which German industry
squeezed every possible advantage from the Third Reich's coal deposits
gave the German war economy a remarkable robustness and probably
lengthened the war by six months to a year.8 But in the final analysis,
the enduring economic and industrial importance of coal notwithstanding,
tactical success at the cutting edge, and thus strategic advantage,
depended on machines fueled by gasoline, diesel fuel and bunker oil.
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If high performance aircraft were a critical determinant of the
outcome of the First World War on land, they were an absolutely
indispensable ingredient of victory on land and at sea in the Second.
Moreover, the capabilities of military aviation had increased to the
point that entire air campaigns were mounted. At least one, the Battle
of Britain, was clearly decisive and others were arguably so, though not
always in a form highlighted by conventional measurements of victory and
defeat. An example can be seen in the devastating effect on the German
war effort of the massive losses of trained aircrew which the Luftwaffe
incurred in the spring of 1943 in efforts to reinforce and then evacuate
German forces in North Africa.9 Tanks, fueled by gasoline and diesel
oil, became a critical tactical determinant of victory on land wherever
terrain permitted their use. Armies spearheaded by armored fighting
vehicles were supplied, at least in the attack, not by rail but by truck
convoy; trucks and tractors replaced horses as field artillery prime
movers. That Wehrmacht petroleum reserves were so scant that the German
Army had to rely on horse traction for tactical logistics and field
artillery mobility would seem, with full wisdom of hindsight, to have
virtually preordained defeat.
The pivotal importance of oil to the war at sea is even more
apparent. The lack of petroleum reserves in the Home Islands forced the
Japanese militarists to go to war or back down in December 1941. The
vulnerability of Japanese merchant shipping, oilers in particular, to
attack by American submarines placed the Japanese war economy in an
ever-tightening noose from 1943 on, a noose made even tighter by
air-dropped mines in the final year of the war. Though the American war
economy was effectively self-sufficient, that of Britain was anything
but and German U Boats and aerial commerce raiders posed a similar
threat to the Western Allies. From the British standpoint, the critical
strategic logistic requirement from the beginning was the provision of
sufficient stocks of petroleum to support naval and air operations from
British bases, a requirement which expanded to encompass the support of
U. S. air forces from 1942 and the support of Allied ground forces on
the continent after D Day. The war at sea intersected with that in the
air and on land in the critical importance of British petroleum stocks,
for those stocks had to be replenished from American and Iranian
oilfields by ship.
The importance of oil to the conduct and outcome of the Second
World War extended well beyond quantitative, macro-economic
considerations. High octane aviation gasoline gave British and American
aircraft, particularly fighters, a critical performance boost not
enjoyed by their Axis equivalents; indeed, some have gone so far as to
attribute British victory in the Battle of Britain to 100 octane
gasoline. Axis engineers were well aware of the performance advantages
conferred by high octane, but the refining process was highly
inefficient, many more barrels of crude being required per barrel of
refined gasoline as octane increased. So long as their sea lanes stayed
open, Britain and America could afford the inefficiency; the Germans,
Japanese and Italians could not, and their fighter pilots entered combat
at a significant handicap.
Beyond the critical importance of petroleum as a fuel, the
relative importance of coal and iron was further eroded by the emergence
in the interwar period of new structural materials with critically
important properties which could not be obtained with steel. Moreover,
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in most cases if not all, reserves of these structural materials lay
beyond the boundaries of the major powers. Far and away the most
important was aluminum, the preeminent structural material for high
performance aircraft from the mid-1930s.10 Rubber, the raw material of
pneumatic tires, O rings, aircraft de-icer boots and a host of other
essential sub-technologies, was a tropical import. Rubber could be
synthesized from petroleum and coal, but the product was inferior, the
process inefficient and the raw materials valuable. Tungsten carbide was
required to give hardness and durability to machine tool cutting heads.
Only small quantities were needed, but there was no substitute and
Germany lacked tungsten deposits, a fact with implications beyond the
machine shop floor. Tungsten carbide is not only extremely hard, but
extremely dense and German engineers developed highly effective
anti-tank ammunition using sub-caliber tungsten carbide penetrators.
Guns designed to fire this ammunition were much lighter and more mobile
than their Allied equivalents and were among the most powerful anti-tank
guns of the war, but shortages of tungsten forced their abandonment in
1942.11
In sum, the preeminence of oil as the crucial determinant of
strategic capability and tactical effectiveness in World War II is
clear. The result was a war in which the ability to move raw materials
over extended distances by sea was both a vital determinant of victory
and a potentially lethal vulnerability. At a lower level of abstraction,
the ability of design engineers to harness the propulsive energy of
petroleum distillates and apply them to the propulsion of military
vehicles played a major role in shaping the outcome of the war. Within
this matrix, the design and production of fighter aircraft was arguably
the most critical node, though the design and production of bombers,
tanks, torpedoes, submarines, artillery pieces, escort and
anti-submarine vessels, assault landing craft, trucks, prime movers and
so on in approximate--and debatable--descending order of importance
followed closely behind. More important than their individual tactical
power and strategic importance, none of these critically important
technologies could be approached in isolation, either from one another
or from the production and logistical apparatus which built and
supported them.
Moreover, the increasing tactical and operational interdependence
of the various technologies of war and their sophistication lent a new
importance to the human factor. The establishments which selected and
trained the crews upon whose skill the effectiveness of military
hardware depended were of pivotal importance. To cite a critical and
illustrative example, the ability of the U. S. and Commonwealth air
forces to generate large numbers of well-trained pilots played a major
role in the defeat of the German and Japanese air arms, while poor
planning and worse execution in this area by the Germans and Japanese
went far to ensure Axis defeat.12 Nor was the importance of recruitment,
selection and training limited to operation of the most expensive and
sophisticated weapons systems: the increasing power and diversity of
infantry weapons and the increasing sophistication of infantry tactics
posed serious challenges for training establishments, not least of all
in the United States where a small peacetime Army and Marine Corps had
to expand enormously in very short order. Raw nationalism had sufficed
to mobilize and motivate millions of recruits at the outset of war in
1914-17. By 1939-41, disillusionment with the ideologies of an earlier
day called for more sophisticated appeals.
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Finally, the Second World War brought home to the Americans and
British, at least, the verity that science not only could contribute to
the war effort but was essential to its prosecution. If the war was run
and won on petroleum, it was guided, directed and shaped by electronics,
optics and acoustics. Just as coal gave way to oil, telegraph wires and
submarine cables gave way to the vacuum tube. As with the internal
combustion engine, there were harbingers in the First World War:
wireless telegraphy was used to control fleets, and at times armies, and
was exploited for intelligence; field telephones came into common use;
the artillery preparations which broke the back of the German Army in
the last year of the war depended on aerial photo-mapping and
photographic reconnaissance for their effectiveness; sophisticated
electronic and acoustic sensors were used to direct counterbattery
fire.13 Between the First and Second World War there was an increase in
communications and sensor capability of at least an order of magnitude:
radar, sonar and electronic cryptanalysis have received the lion's share
of attention; but on a day-to-day basis aerial photo reconnaissance was
of at least comparable importance, particularly to the British and their
American understudies who used it most effectively; and voice radio and
intercommunications systems had enormous impact across the board.14 But
the most important change was not in capability, but in use: Sensors and
electronic communications were tactically and operationally important in
World War I, and at times played a vital role. In World War II, they not
only totally recast the face of war tactically, they had direct
strategic impact: the British, and then Anglo-American, systematic,
centrally-directed collection and analysis of photographic, electronic
and human intelligence is the most dramatic example, though by no means
the only one.
Still, both world wars were won as much by production as
technique, though the quality of what was produced was important to the
outcome, particularly in the second. In sum, both wars were won by
engaging and overwhelming the enemy production and population base. In
World War I, this was accomplished indirectly though attrition of
manpower and material at the front and by eroding the war economy and
civilian morale through naval blockade. Direct attack on allied sea
lines of communication by submarine had the potential to cause the
collapse of the British war economy, but inadequate resource allocation
doomed the German U Boat campaign to failure. In World War II,
production and population bases were exposed to direct attack by aerial
bombardment, and economic attrition by submarine attack came into its
own, though the Germans once more put inadequate resources into the
effort.
The military leaders of the United States and their civilian
superiors learned the lessons of World War I as well as the leaders of
any major power. Granted, the British taught the Americans some vital
lessons in technique, but it is safe to say that by 1944-45, the U.S.
military establishment had embraced and mastered a war paradigm which
corresponded very closely to strategic reality. It is important to note
that this paradigm incorporated a keen appreciation of the importance of
technological advantage and of the need to systematically pursue that
advantage in time of peace. This perception stemmed largely from
painful memories of the unpreparedness of its air arm and field
artillery when the United States entered World War I.15 That perception
found expression in the steady expansion of aerodynamic knowledge by the
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National Advisory Committee on Aviation (NACA) during the interwar years
which yielded important dividends in World War II.16 It also found
expression in the design of a range of thoroughly capable artillery
pieces, already in production when war came, and a rationalized scheme
for the production of trucks and prime movers.17
Still, at bottom, insofar as technology was concerned, the central
focus of the American war paradigm was on production. The creation after
World War II and continued existence of the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces provide eloquent testimony to that emphasis, an emphasis
which is deeply imbedded in the U.S. military services' corporate
memories and thought processes. John Patrick has neatly encapsulated
that reality in his perceptive description of the U.S. Army, Navy, and
Air Force as “classic industrial institutions."18
The fundamental underpinnings of the paradigm, however, were
shaken by the advent of the nuclear age. After a brief period of
unexploited monopoly, nuclear proliferation set in. The United States
and its primary allies faced the reality of the Cold War; they also
faced a situation in which their industrial bases were secure from
direct attack save by a massive nuclear strike which would surely have
been answered in kind.
In the United States, the immediate response at the national level
was to embrace a new and radically different war paradigm under the
rubric of massive retaliation. Confident under the atomic and then
thermo-nuclear umbrellas, Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D.
Eisenhower drew down conventional forces. To their great credit,
elements within the Army and Navy challenged the validity of the new
paradigm but it took the Korean War to demonstrate that defense could
not be bought on the cheap with nuclear weapons. The lesson was that the
United States needed deployable divisions, carrier task forces and the
draft. After the Korean War, the two paradigms uneasily coexisted side
by side and the resultant inconsistencies produced problems: the Air
Force, at least, continued to assume that air power should be applied as
it had been in World War II. Consequently, the United States bombed
North Korea as if it were Nagoya or the Rhur. Over a decade later, the
essence of Air Force plans for bombing North Vietnam was not
substantially different.19
As the U.S. defense establishment relearned the value of
conventional forces, concern for the cost of national defense came to
the fore, and defense dollars became tight. The attention of senior
military officers and staffs was directed increasingly to the
competition for funding for weapons system procurement. Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara's establishment of rules for the competition
in the form of PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) only
formalized and accelerated an ongoing trend. By focusing preemptively on
rigorous quantitative analysis of cost benefit effectiveness, PPBS
subtly inhibited technological innovation: to calculate whether or not
something is worth its cost, one must know precisely what it will do.
Since by definition it is impossible to precisely predict the effect of
something which has never been made before, advantage in the PPBS arena
accrued to systems which offered incremental improvements of tried and
true technologies whose effect could be predicted with reasonable
accuracy. Should anyone be surprised, then, that an extraordinarily high
proportion of weapons systems procurement programs which have yielded
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major advances in military capability were the product of “black"
programs, originated and managed outside the PPBS mainstream? The
bureaucracies that blossomed throughout the defense establishment were
managed by military accountants who, in addition to confusing efficiency
with effectiveness, also inhibited imagination and innovation. One
should not be surprised that black programs, on the other hand, seem to
have been more successful than those which have had to run the entire
PPBS gauntlet.20
At the same time, while the awesome power of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons was monopolizing the attention of defense
intellectuals and PPBS that of military professionals, emergent new
technologies were beginning to gnaw away at what we might term the
classical, World War-derived, war paradigm and its massive
retaliation-derived supplement. Salient among these technologies in
rough chronological order were: digital electronic computers; new sensor
systems, particularly in the infrared spectrum; new structural
materials, first simple ablatives for ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) warhead heat shields, and then entirely new materials such as
phenolic resin honeycomb, reinforced carbon and fiberglass boron fiber
composites; and, last but most decisive in net effect, transistors and
the miniaturized and more powerful analytical computers which they
spawned. One could add to the list the turbojet engine, which fit the
existing war paradigm very nicely, but which in the form of very small,
highly fuel efficient powerplants for cruise missiles and RPVs (remotely
piloted vehicles) challenges it directly today.
It is worth noting, however, that many of these new technologies
were developed and initially exploited for explicitly military purposes
during World War II. The story of the turbojets' independent development
in Germany and Britain is well known. Ablative materials were discovered
more or less accidentally in the V-2 program and computer technology got
an enormous boost from the demands of cryptanalysis in the United States
and Britain. The guidance mechanism on the later V-2s was the first
reprogrammable electronic analog computer.21
For a time, these innovations fit our bifurcated war paradigm
reasonably well. But of greater importance over the long term, the
application of the paradigm continued to promote effective innovation.
In the 1950s systematic development of jet engine technology combined
with innovative airframe design and far-sighted military requirements to
produce the jet bombers which made nuclear deterrence a strategic
reality pending the development of ICBMs. Those same jet bombers, with
the B-47 as the seminal design, spawned the Boeing 707 and its
imitators, giving air transportation a whole new strategic dimension.22
They also forced the development of air-to-air refueling which gave U.S.
air operations an unprecedented flexibility which no other nation can
match. Ablative heat shields combined with the discovery by NASA
engineers of the aerodynamic and thermal advantages of detached shock
wave reentry to make the ICBM a practical reality.
Then, beginning in the 1960s, the new technologies began to
combine synergistically with unprecedented and largely unanticipated
impact. Perhaps the first concrete indication of the potential of the
new technologies came with the fielding by the U.S. Navy of a massive
underwater passive sonar array to track Soviet ballistic missile
submarines. The use of passive sonar to locate submarines was hardly
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new; the use of analytical computers with logic and memory circuits
capable of discriminating between the whisper of a nuclear submarine's
passage and the rumbles, squeaks and whistles of the sea was. The
Vietnam War produced yet other harbingers: the Army fielded the first
operational stealth aircraft, the Lockheed YO-3A used for night
observation.23 Navy and Air Force airmen made effective use of
electro-optical and laser-guided bombs (EOGBs and LGBs) to strike
heavily-defended targets with unprecedented accuracy in the Linebacker
bombing offensives.24 These developments, however, took effect in
isolation.
By the late 1980s, the emergent technologies were rapidly
converging to produce an unprecedented array of new capabilities. The
driving force was the transistor: transistors immediately permitted
order of magnitude reductions in size for the same computing capacity,
directly because transistors are much smaller than vacuum tubes which
perform an equivalent function and indirectly because they require far
less power and emit far less heat. Of at least equal importance
transistors are infinitely more reliable than vacuum tubes. The
magnitude of the difference and the speed with which it was exploited is
illustrated by two examples: the SM-64 Navaho, a sophisticated
vertically-launched airbreathing cruise missile of the mid- to late
1950s with a cruise vehicle about the size of an F-15; and the mach 2
capable B-58, which entered service in 1957. The Navaho was an
aerodynamic success and the rocket engine which powered its piggy-back
booster was a direct ancestor of rockets which put man on the moon, but
the unreliability of its vacuum tube circuitry earned it the name
“Never-go Navaho," even as a research vehicle. Like the Navaho, the B-58
was an aerodynamic success and an operational failure, though not for
the same reason; fast as it was, it could not outrun Soviet air-to-air
missiles. The core of the B-58 bomb-nav system was a 1,200 pound
electronic analog computer, the largest ever made, with a ticker tape
readout.25 The guidance and navigation computers of the Tomahawks and
ALCMS (Air Launched Cruise Missiles) used in DESERT STORM, designed to
do the same basic job as those of the Navaho and B-58, are not much
larger than a carton of cigarettes.
But the importance of the size and reliability of avionics
components is not the only lesson to be gleaned from the Navaho and B-58
stories. Each system exploited mature technologies which were at or near
their limits of development and, barring the development of novel
replacement technologies, are likely to remain so. The Navaho cruise
vehicle tested the aerodynamic theories which were the basis for the
development of our current generation of air-to-air fighter aircraft,
pioneering the outward-splayed twin vertical stabilizers which are a
feature of every high performance multi-engined U.S. fighter since the
F-14. The Navaho booster's liquid oxygen/kerosene-fueled rocket engine
represented a significant improvement over earlier rockets in
thrust-to-weight ratio and efficiency, but subsequent advances have been
modest for reasons rooted in unalterable physical reality: the chemical
energy resident in known oxidizer/ propellant combinations and the
molecular weights of their decomposition products.26 As one progresses
to more energetic and efficient fuel/oxidizer combinations, the
difficulties of containment and handling increase exponentially, yet
improvements in performance are comparatively modest.27 For certain
high priority applications, of course, the incremental increase in
performance justifies the increased technical risk and cost, but it is
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worth noting that the Titan, a mid-1950s design, is still our workhorse
booster for heavy unmanned payloads and the even older Atlas booster and
Agena upper stage remain first-line equipment.28
The same point can be made with regard to the J-79 turbojets which
powered the B-58. The turbofan engines which power today's first line
fighters and bombers are far more fuel efficient than the J-79, but as a
practical matter few of the aircraft they drive are much faster than the
B-58. USAF F-4G "Wild Weasel" anti-radiation attack aircraft powered by
J-79s were first line equipment in DESERT STORM, and if their
fuel-guzzling engines required more trips to the tanker than newer
strike aircraft, the F-4Gs were at no great disadvantage in speed,
ordnance carriage or maneuverability. Simply put, given kerosene-based
jet fuels and aluminum structures, performance improvements for manned
combat aircraft have been marginal since the mid-1960s and are likely to
remain so.29 Granted, exotic engines burning exotic fuels can drive
specialized airbreathing platforms made of exotic materials to much
greater speeds; the largely titanium SR-71 cruised at mach 3.5+ and its
successors will be considerably faster (perhaps already are) but such
vehicles are expensive, highly specialized and require enormous amounts
of skill and care to operate. The one area in which the United States
can anticipate major improvements in aerospace vehicle propulsion over
the short term is in extremely small airbreathing engines for
remotely-piloted vehicles and cruise missiles, and here the improvement
will be in not in speed, but in compactness, fuel efficiency and range.
To return to the main argument, shrinkage of avionics packages
with the advent of transistors was only the tip of the iceberg, for
transistorized circuitry also permitted enormous increases in computing
power. On a mundane level, the increased power of design computers
turned finite element stress analysis from an exotic, time-consuming
routine applied only to the most critical of complex stress analyses to
the workhorse of structural engineering in the mid- to late 1980s. On a
more exotic level, powerful design computers made feasible the complex
multivariable analyses of radar returns as function of aspect, geometry,
reflectivity and structural properties which made stealth aircraft a
reality. The result was a revolution not only in the capabilities and
reliability of existing categories of systems, but an ability to design
entirely new kinds of weaponry.
The tactical results were demonstrated dramatically in DESERT
STORM. In terms of operational impact, the salient capabilities were:
LGBs used in combination with night-capable target acquisition and
tracking devices; sophisticated night-capable tank fire control systems;
the ability to operate at night in general; the operational debut of
stealth in the form of the F-117A; long range cruise missiles capable of
genuine precision, notably the Tomahawk; the widespread use of secure
voice communications and facsimile machines for command, control and
coordination; the massive use of air refueling, as much for operational
flexibility as for simple range extension; the advent of
beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat as an operational reality; and the
operational debut of airborne radar systems like JSTARS, capable of
monitoring the land battle in detail.
The fact that they were deployed against an enemy inferior in many
critical systems and training notwithstanding, the application of these
capabilities in combination struck with unprecedented tactical and
17

operational impact. They also produced unanticipated problems, notably
in the difficulty of applying our intelligence systems and analytical
methods to the unprecedentedly swift tempo of the war.
A handful of predictable errors notwithstanding, American ground
and air forces were remarkably successful in conducting and supporting a
highly mobile, highly lethal, land war without defined fronts. This was
a training achievement of the first magnitude: total U.S. casualties
approximated in number what a cynic might have expected to ensue from
that many men and women driving that far, that fast and at night over
the same terrain without opposition. The quality of American aircrew
training was equally apparent: for the Air Force, at least, the aircraft
accident rate, indeed the total loss rate per flying hour, went down.
One's first reaction on appreciating the full magnitude of what
U.S. and allied forces had achieved in DESERT STORM was to draw a
parallel with Robert Clive's victory at the battle of Plassey in 1757 in
which 850 British troops and 2,100 Sepoys trained to British standards
prevailed over a force of some 52,000 Indians and 200 French
mercenaries.30 Just as well-trained and equipped Western European armies
and navies of the late 18th and 19th centuries were able to defeat
forces not trained to European standards almost without regard to
numerical odds, it is likely then that a balanced U.S. force of all
arms, properly equipped and supported and competently led, could defeat
any number of anything else. Certain of our allies, notably the British,
can achieve similar results when backed by specialized U.S. support in
critical areas such as electronic warfare.
Turning from technology and tactics to strategic limits poses two
questions: to what extent does the revolution in military technology
expand strategic capabilities; and to what extent does the prevailing
war paradigm hold true? Of the two, the second may be the more critical
understanding of the nature of war; and how it is waged will directly
determine not only tactical and operational effectiveness in future
conflicts but also strategic success. The technological and tactical
revolution witnessed over the last decade was undergirded by
evolutionary adjustments in the war paradigm which have the potential to
yield major strategic dividends. At the same time, the threat has
changed in ways which are so fundamental as to require an extensive
rethinking of the strategic equation.
As suggested above, the primary technological constraints to U.S.
strategic capabilities in the two world wars in which this basic war
paradigm was forged involved productive capacity rather than tactical
capability. Note, however, that the tactical capabilities of individual
weapons systems were more important to the outcome of the Second World
War than the First and that the United States and its principal ally,
Britain, were rather successful in anticipating the shift and planning
for it. In this sense, the development of the technologies fielded in
DESERT STORM was more an evolutionary trend than a revolution in
military thought. This encouraging thought must be balanced by a more
sober one: as noted implicitly at the outset, the geopolitical and
social contexts of the two world wars were strikingly similar. Indeed,
some have suggested that the Second World War was merely a continuation
of the First, an argument which makes a good deal of sense. By contrast,
the geographic, economic, political and social contexts of the wars of
the present differ dramatically from those of the two world wars, and it
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is likely that those of the 21st century will diverge even more sharply
from the conflicts in which the American war paradigm was forged. Not
only has the economic and diplomatic structure of the international
system undergone radical change in the wake of Tiananmen Square, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany; social and
economic expectations around the globe have changed as well.
In sum, the threat has changed substantively but the war paradigm
has not. The ancient warrior, now wielding a bronze piercing axe and
wearing a helmet of Electrum, must face not only enemy champions, but a
host of smaller, more subtle and more elusive foes whose objectives are
not always apparent. The excellence of this hero's weapons and his
strength and skill in using them still count, but he and his smith must
anticipate major changes in the weaponry which he can expect to be used
against him and those he is sworn to protect.
What technologies, then, should the American military expect to
face in the 21st century? Beginning at the top of the spectrum of
technological sophistication and working down, nuclear proliferation
will remain a major concern. Indeed, sub-proliferation might be a better
term, since the possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of political
entities below the level of the nation-state is apt to become a reality
soon, if it is not already. The bad news is the relatively easy
availability of plutonium and enriched uranium on the international
black market. The good news is that those most inclined to develop and
use nuclear weapons lack the scientific, engineering and technical
resources to build compact weapons and sophisticated delivery systems.
At least the first wave of “outlaw" nuclear weapons will be relatively
large and crude.
One terminal effect of nuclear weapons, however, which does not
require the detonation of the device in close proximity to the target
demands attention. Electro-magnetic pulse, or EMP, the wave of
highly-charged electrical particles proceeds from the nuclear event like
an expanding bubble at speeds approaching that of light. EMP, which
takes effect as an extremely short burst of very high-voltage electrical
energy, has the capacity to do enormous damage to electrical circuits.
Transistorized circuits, on which the day-to-day functioning of modern
society is increasingly reliant, are particularly vulnerable. A cursory
review of the historical record suggests that the detonation in low
earth orbit or the upper atmosphere of a relatively crude nuclear device
would wreak havoc over a wide area on a host of transistor-dependent
systems, including electrical power generation and transmission;
telephone, radio and television transmission and reception; information
storage and retrieval systems; aircraft avionics; truck and automobile
ignition and fuel control units; and medical life-sustaining and
monitoring equipment.31 Circuits can be protected against EMP by
"hardening," that is shielding, and critical military systems have been
hardened on a selective basis, but hardening is an arcane science and
expensive.
On a more mundane level, the allies experienced great difficulty
with mobile ballistic missile systems in DESERT STORM, and the system
involved was the primitive first generation Soviet SS-1 "Scud." Such
systems have enormous potential for mischief, particularly if mated with
chemical or bacteriological warheads. The problem is not just military,
but political as well, for there are many regions of the world where the
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launch of such a missile could be credibly attributed to more than one
entity, making the appropriateness as well as the effectiveness of the
military response an issue. Fortunately, the relatively long-range
ballistic systems are, in principle, subject to interception and
destruction by defensive missiles. Since ballistic trajectories are
predictable, the interception problem is relatively straightforward,
though highly demanding of sensor, avionics, booster, fusing and warhead
systems. The problem of terminal defense against ballistic missiles is
solvable given the willingness to commit the necessary resources.
Stealth cruise missiles present a greater challenge. While it is
unlikely that any enemy will be able to approach the U.S. lead in the
design and production of piloted stealth aircraft for the next few
decades, the suppression of radar signatures becomes easier by a
geometric ratio as the size of the vehicle is reduced. It is thus much
easier to make a very small vehicle stealthy, a consideration which
becomes more relevant in light of the advent of the extremely small,
extremely efficient air-breathing engines mentioned above. Moreover, the
United States has provided potential enemies with the basis for a
precision guidance system in the form of uncoded signals from Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites. The ability to develop long-range,
stealthy cruise missiles with precision accuracy, at least against
stationary targets, is within the grasp of many national aerospace
industries and such vehicles would be exceedingly difficult to defend
against.
All the above concerns address conventional munitions and delivery
systems. More frightening are the less traditional systems. The design
of sophisticated chemical agents does not require massive technical
infrastructure and computer- assisted design capability. Moreover, such
agents need not be lethal in an immediate physiological sense, and the
development of agents with sophisticated psychological effects, whether
transient or permanent, is a possibility that must be considered.
Finally, there are nontraditional targeting and delivery methods to be
considered: chemical agents can be delivered by introduction into the
water supply and food chain as well as the atmosphere.
The same undemanding technical and economic constraints on design
and delivery apply even more powerfully to bacteriological and viral
agents than to chemical weapons. At the lower end of the technology
spectrum, the use of natural selection to develop microorganisms with
desired immunities and lethalities has the potential to produce highly
destructive agents at extremely low cost. At the upper end, the use of
genetic engineering to produce novel agents would still be relatively
cheap. Disease agents offer a wide range of terminal effects which could
be tailored to strategic goals. A highly virulent, fast-acting disease
organism with high lethality could quickly kill off the bulk of the
populace in the target area and burn itself out, leaving a depopulated
area open for occupation. Conversely, moderately virulent, slow-acting
bacterial or viral agents with moderate lethality, perhaps engineered to
produce chronic rather than acute effects, would be at least equally
difficult to counter. The longer the incubation period and the
slower-acting the disease, the greater the difficulty of detection and
the greater the damage done prior to identification. In either case, the
disease organism could be aimed at crops, domestic animals, or perhaps
the environment, rather than directly at populations. Selective
targeting could be achieved through the use of insect or animal vectors,
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and disease organisms biologically engineered to strike selectively
according to age, gender, race or behavior are entirely possible. Such
agents would have enormous potential for social and political
disruption, particularly if used in concert with a well-crafted
psychological warfare campaign. The remarkably wide acceptance of the
story that AIDS was a capitalist or racist plot hints at the potential
of such a coordinated campaign. More simply, political targeting could
be accomplished by a combination of biological engineering and physical
distribution. It would be a relatively easy matter to develop a strain
of staphylococcus immune to avaiable antibiotics. Inadvertently, this
has nearly been done through the widespread, indiscriminate use of
antibiotics. Such an agent could be used to attack segments of a
national health care system catering to a given socioeconomic strata or
ethnic group and the disruptive effect of such an attack could be
amplified by a coordinated campaign of propaganda and disinformation
designed to exploit the predictably defensive responses of public health
officials.
Returning to electronics, American society, the U.S. economy, and
the world trade system are increasingly dependent on the exchange and
analysis of information by electronic means. Those means are vulnerable
to physical attack, electronic disruption, and manipulation. As with
bacteriological attack, an electronic assault could be mounted with
minimal capital investment: the successes of computer hackers in gaining
access to restricted data bases and planting electronic viruses in data
exchange networks speak for themselves. Intrusion into classified
Department of Defense and contractor databases is an obvious possibility
as is compromise of militarily sensitive command and control circuits,
analytical computers, and classified data bases. These circuits are
presumably well-protected and monitored. However, such an attack would
be the electronic equivalent of a frontal assault, likely to be detected
quickly and repelled. More subtle, and more likely to produce strategic
results, would be a sophisticated attack on selected nodes of the
American social and economic fabric, again accompanied by a coordinated
psychological warfare campaign. An attack on financial market and stock
exchange data bases to subtly manipulate interest rates, profits, and
losses so as to erode the savings--and the confidence--of selected
segments of society is an obvious tactic. International credit, currency
conversion and banking systems are vulnerable as well. As with
biological attack, a slow-acting, moderately virulent "disease" would be
harder to detect and counter than a fast-acting, highly virulent one.
Moreover, a campaign of subtle electronic sabotage would very likely
trigger a defensive reaction from governmental and semi-governmental
regulatory agencies and denials that anything was amiss would add
credibility to charges that the government was deliberately inflicting
injustice.32 Intrusion into the data bases of the Internal Revenue
Service and state revenue systems to introduce injustices and
inequities, perhaps by selectively targeting particular groups for
audits and seizures of assets, has obvious potential as well. Any such
attack would have to be undergirded not only with a deep understanding
of the workings of the markets in question, but of the social, economic
and political dynamics of American society; that having been said, the
potential vulnerability in this area is enormous.
Having surveyed the technological face of the threat environment,
this monograph concludes with a brief examination U.S. capabilities and
posture. Here prescriptions are mainly intellectual rather than
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technological and tactical. Just as the Chalcolithic hero girded himself
for battle and for the evaluation of new technologies with an appeal to
the gods of war and his village, so, in secular guise do today's
planners, programmers, and budgeters. The gods are, however, changing
and mortals must take account of the change. First, some cautionary
observations.
PPBS made a good deal of sense in an era in which technological
change was incremental and attacks on the enemy war economy and
population base were the primary strategic focus. The assumptions no
longer hold and the "theology" badly needs revision, and the term
theology is used literally. There is no credible demonstration that the
rigorous application of cost benefit effectiveness analysis to the
weapons system acquisition process under the aegis of PPBS has, in fact,
had a beneficial effect. PPBS has been accepted not as a methodology
with demonstrable benefits, but as a verity accepted on faith and the
rational basis of that faith badly needs reexamination. If PPBS is a
false god, the American military may be well-advised to consider the
cost of its misplaced devotion sooner rather than later.
The evidence suggests that a technological plateau has been
achieved in terms of speed, firepower, armor protection and mobility.
Barring the development of revolutionary new structural materials and
technologies of propulsion which violate the laws of physics as now
understood (a possibility which cannot be discounted), current
state-of-the-art aircraft, ships, and land vehicles go nearly as fast
and can expend about as much firepower as will be the case for the
foreseeable future. The significant technological advances will come in
sensors and detection systems; avionics, guidance and fire control
systems; stealth technology across the board; electronic warfare
systems; the biological sciences; “virtual reality" training; and, most
important, analytical computers, particularly for analysis and design.
Planners must be careful to avoid temptations to expend disproportionate
amounts of treasure and energy to achieve incremental improvements to
existing technologies. In the past, sufferers from what I term the
"technological attractive nuisance syndrome" attempted to field the
caseless cartridge, the diesel aircraft engine, and the atomic airplane.
To cite an example of current relevance, if liquid artillery propellants
offer operational advantages over those now in use which are
sufficiently compelling to justify major expenditures of scarce R&D
funds, the point is not readily apparent.33
Granted, there are areas of more of less traditional technology
where we are still an appreciable distance from the edge of the
performance envelope: high speed vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
with sufficiently low rotor downwash velocities for general battlefield
utility and very small RPVs are cases in point. There are also areas
where the incremental advantage is worth the price: hypersonic
atmospheric reconnaissance platforms are an obvious candidate.
Cryptography would seem to have reached a plateau of security, but that
is what the experts have wrongly concluded in the past on several
occasions. Clearly, obsolescent equipment has to be replaced as it wears
out and there are important advances to be made in reliability and
stealthiness in the process, but on the whole, R&D money and energy will
be far better spent on software than hardware.
The United States increasingly depends on imported materials for
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the production and transportation of war materiel, petroleum being the
most critical requirement in the short term but by no means the only
one. At the same time, as in the Vietnam War, the American military is
apt to go up against adversaries whose war production and population
base reside in other countries. The United States was not successful in
dealing with this problem in Vietnam at any level: tactical,
operational, or strategic. Fortunately, this problem has received
objective analysis from a cadre of historians like Larry E. Cable, Mark
Clodfelter, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Their
analyses warrant careful consideration by scholars and military
professionals.
On a more positive note, there are no serious prospects of the
U.S. lead in the design of high technology weapons systems being
challenged in the near term, or even over next few decades--if it is
careful to preserve it. The analytical and design capabilities which
made possible the Tomahawk, the M1A1 fire control system and the F-117A
were the products of many decades of continuous intellectual tradition
and governmental support. They could not be reconstituted overnight with
the wave of a budgetary wand. Just as the Chalcolithic hero depended on
his smith, so are today's progressively less numerous champions
dependent on their engineers.
In addition, there is a downside to these impressive technological
capabilities: specifically, improved tactical capabilities breed
heightened strategic expectations. The ability to take out a single
building with a single bomb on a single pass fosters not only the
expectation that this can be done routinely, but that to do so is
strategically relevant. On a practical level, to make that capability
relevant one must know with some precision what is inside the building,
why it is important and when it will be there. Note that the answers to
those questions are as likely to be political as military, posing a
significant challenge for intelligence gathering and dissemination
agencies. For the foreseeable future, the United States is more likely
to be engaged in relatively small-scale regional conflicts where
leadership, cultural symbols and political motivation are key factors
than in major conflicts where we can target the industrial base. In the
past, the United States has not always been spectacularly successful in
evaluating such intangible, human factors. It badly needs to improve its
intelligence and analytical capabilities.
The ability to minimize collateral civilian casualties, an ability
demonstrated spectacularly in DESERT STORM, the bombing of the Al Firdoz
bunker notwithstanding, carries with it the assumption that any
collateral civilian casualties are unacceptable, however reprehensible
enemy policy goals and however vicious enemy tactics. Similarly, the
ability to minimize losses to enemy fire throws even minimal losses to
"friendly fire" into stark relief. Military leaders must be forewarned
not to mis-advertise their capabilities. Furthermore, they must educate
their civilian superiors, all the more so because of the political
attractiveness of certain of those capabilities.
High technology weaponry is highly dependent on user skill and
training for tactical effectiveness. DESERT STORM was as much a triumph
of hard, realistic, combat-oriented training as of design engineering.
Indeed, many military professionals would argue that training was more
important, and some have gone so far as to speculate that we could have
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exchanged systems with the Iraqis and still won. That is no doubt an
overstatement, but the point behind it is valid. Our military services
learned the value of combat-oriented training the hard way in Vietnam
and we now enjoy a huge lead in this area, but such training is
expensive and operations and maintenance budgets will remain under
intense pressure. We must be extremely careful not to throw away our
advantage in this critical area.
Finally, the nature of the strategic, operational and tactical
environment in which our forces will operate in the 21st century must be
rethought and force structures adjusted accordingly. The recent military
technological revolution has provided unprecedented, and for the moment
unchallenged, tactical and operational capabilities. As was demonstrated
in DESERT STORM, the American military can exploit its technological
advantages when faced with a conventional threat. The challenge is to
harness those capabilities to the less conventional kinds of wars which
will surely arise with increasing frequency. The crux of the matter is
not our ability to put bombs on target or men, munitions, and vehicles
on beaches and landing zones; the pivotal issue is the identification of
strategically relevant targets, beaches and landing zones, an area where
improvement is imperative.
The very precision offered by technologically advanced munitions
demands an equivalent precision and timeliness in targeting. That, in
turn, demands timely and accurate intelligence, not only before the
fact, but afterwards in accurate bomb damage assessments. The focus of
the preceding observation was on air operations, but if anything the
demands of ground combat for timely and accurate intelligence are even
greater, if for no other reason because intelligence failure in ground
combat tends to produce more friendly casualties. The need for swift,
accurate intelligence is increased exponentially by the reality of
smaller force structures, justified in part by the capabilities of
precision-guided munitions, an observation which requires a cautionary
note: certain categories of target do not lend themselves to attack by
PGMs, but are best dealt with by massive, nonprecision bombardment.
Mobile ground formations on the move, dug in defensive lines and major
storage and production facilities are cases in point. Despite the
tactical fascination with PGMs, there will always be a need for massed
artillery bombardments and large numbers of “dumb" bombs dropped by
small numbers of large aircraft.
In sum, intelligence must be more subtle, timely and accurate. The
services can no longer afford the luxury of the compartmentalized
intelligence functions which were a logical product of the old war
paradigm, the cold war focus on nuclear weapons. Rather, the
intelligence function must be integrated with operational planning and
execution more closely than ever before. Intelligence must also expand
its focus to address the sorts of nontraditional threats outlined above,
a venture in which exchanges of information with civilian law
enforcement agencies will become pivotal and in which the specialist
noncombat arms will have an important role to play. The sticky
constitutional issues raised by the prospect of close interaction
between civilian law enforcement agencies and military intelligence must
be resolved and indicate the changing face of strategy. The Army, by
virtue of its structure and historical past, will inevitably be at the
epicenter of such changes. The Corps of Engineers would seem a logical
institutional locus for assessments of the vulnerability of urban areas
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and public utilities to attack and sabotage. Similarly, the Medical
Corps should become centrally involved in assessments of hostile
chemical and bacteriological capabilities and the development of
appropriate countermeasures. Judge advocates must develop hands-on
familiarity with the nitty-gritty of operational planning and tactical
execution so as to be able to provide commanders and planners with
timely, relevant and accurate legal guidance.34 The central importance
of news media coverage of military operations demands that public
information personnel develop a similar familiarity with operational
planning and tactical execution. By the same token, commanders and
operational staffs must become more sensitive to the importance of input
from such specialists.
In conclusion, two basic points are clear: if strategy could ever
be approached as a straightforward technical exercise in the movement of
military formations across country, war on the map as Jomini put it,
followed by an equally straightforward, though considerably bloodier,
exercise in fire and maneuver on the battlefield, that time is long
past. Similarly, if there was ever a time when war could be approached
as an exercise in production line engineering, as the U.S. Army Air
Forces did in preparation for World War II, that time is long past, as
well.35 The maneuver of conventional forces and industrial production
will remain important integers in the strategic equation, but they are
no longer preeminent.
And so this analysis of the technological limits of strategy ends
on a cautionary note about the essentially human nature of war. The
Chalcolithic hero understood implicitly that success in war was
determined not just by strength and technological advantage alone, but
by the effective application of those qualities in human context. The
perceived force of his blow was increased by faith in his gods and fear
of them. Just as the gods of his village presided over his swing,
understanding of policy goals presides over our application of military
force. Whatever the technology, war remains as Carl von Clausewitz
characterized it, a test of will and faith. Do not lose sight of that
reality.
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